IHQ and USHQ Relationships

Summary: This article examines the years from the birth of our international headquarters at the end of 1974 until the appointment of Terry Taylor as US director in 1984. Four later concerns are listed at the end, but none was as widely and persistently contentious as the first traumatic period lasting for about six years from 1977. Money and personalities were primary irritants within a poorly understood structure.

I appeal to you, brothers and sisters, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of you agree with one another in what you say and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be perfectly united in mind and thought.
1 Corinthians 1:1

Contents

Lorne Sanny’s Leadership Structure
Financial Arrangements
Emerging Tensions
Attempts to Develop a More Relational Structure
Influences of New US and IET Leaders

Lorne Sanny’s Leadership Structure

Until the early 1970s, there was one international headquarters which served our international president across the full range of his responsibilities, which included leading the US Navigators.

However, in July 1973, then-President Lorne Sanny appointed a US director (Skip Gray). Also, in September 1973, he appointed an executive vice president (Jack Mayhall) who was to guide the divisional (or continental) directors, who nevertheless continued to report to Sanny. This reporting arrangement had similarities to what had been adopted at the Overseas Directors Conference in June 1964, namely that the overseas director would be responsible to Sanny for the entire overseas work, but that the continental directors would have “complete and free access to direct communication with the president.”

Clearly, this was a response to an emerging reality: It was no longer helpful to conceptualize The Navigators as an American work with some small overseas branches. Furthermore, Sanny realized that he could no longer effectively discharge the roles both of US director and of “global” director, given that we were ministering in some thirty countries.1

As our first executive vice president (for the entire work), Mayhall applied his gift for organizing and clarifying. He decided2 to disentangle the supportive functions within the international HQ. His purpose was to clarify what was properly a responsibility of the US Navs and what was not. To use a metaphor of the period, he was to reduce the frequency of “wearing two hats.”

One may note, in passing, that the term “international” has several meanings:

• Moving from one country to another
• Applying to more than one country
• Global or worldwide

By the phrase “international HQ,” we meant meaning 3, “covering the world.”

He proposed a separation between IHQ and USHQ. In his words, that “we draw a distinct line between the international HQ side of things and the USHQ side of things . . . both people and budgets . . . and, at some point, the two HQs should be separated geographically even if just at different ends of Glen Eyrie.” There were in fact six broad reasons:

• To give identity to those operating globally
• To clarify and establish “the president’s team”
• To be the administrative reflection of the field International Leadership Team3/li>
• To lessen the apparent size of the US administration
• To encourage financial support from other countries
• To downplay American throw-weight and control systems

Mayhall chose a simple rule of thumb: Those whose work was at least 80 percent related to the progress of our US corporation should be assigned to the emerging US headquarters. Thus, for example, Jerry Bridges as treasurer was placed in USHQ whereas Bob Hopkins as personnel administrator was placed in IHQ. The former had legal and financial responsibilities centered on the US corporation while the latter was invested in the analysis and movement of staff of every nationality.4

This separation into two headquarters took place in December 1974. It was, of course, somewhat arbitrary. However, it proved to be beneficial. Two early outcomes stand out:

• Mayhall invited Donald McGilchrist to become his assistant, moving in March 1976 from the UK to IHQ.5
• When the divisional directors met in April 1975 near London (in itself, a symbolic venue), they were collectively given the new title of International Leadership Team (ILT).

Though Sanny was present, this launch meeting of the ILT was chaired by Mayhall, and the new US director (Skip Gray) sat alongside the divisional directors for other segments of the world. The reality that the US was a country and the other divisions were amalgams of countries was not nearly as important as the emergence of the US as a distinct and vital unit with its own director and board.6

As their new collective title communicated, Sanny made it clear to the divisional directors that he wanted them to function as a global team. This was in contrast to their previous modus operandi, which had been principally to act as advocates for their segments of the world,7 a mindset that had been somewhat too visible in the competition for resources (missionaries and money) since the introduction of the “Strategy for the 70s” in December 1972.

Thus, in the brief period that he served as executive vice president, Mayhall had largely freed the US Navs to model what was ultimately expected of our future8 established countries. He had also strengthened IHQ by bringing in a resource person from outside the US Navs. IHQ remained in the power plant near the Glen Eyrie castle, while USHQ moved to the space above the maintenance shops,9 so that the separation was visible, even as both units continued on Glen Eyrie. Thus was the groundwork laid for our gradual evolution toward becoming a Global Society.

Sanny had commented that a principle of operation should be to centralize management upwards and to decentralize decision-making outward. Therefore, a smaller international headquarters building would be better for us administratively and psychologically and would give us more flexibility.10

Meanwhile, newly led by Mayhall, our US leaders decided in September 1976 to construct a USHQ building, but to furnish only the upper floor.11

Financial Arrangements

By 1976, IHQ had been reduced to a minimum operational level, as regards staff and budgets. At that point, it accounted for some 1.3 percent of our global budget.

However, Mayhall had struggled with his responsibilities as executive vice president. How could he guide and influence the divisional directors when they still reported to Sanny? This did not fit with his largely managerial paradigm.

Sanny appointed him as US director in July 1976, to replace Skip Gray. Although Jim Downing was still within IHQ as the senior aide to Sanny, it was not until Jerry White became executive director in 1983 that Sanny had all the resources that he needed within his own office.

When Mayhall transferred to USHQ, Sanny asked McGilchrist to stay on his team rather than transfer. However, the gradual spread of the latter’s activities and responsibilities sometimes raised questions, which leads us into the tensions that came to a head in the early 1980s.

First, however, we take note of a few developments,13 largely financial, before the end of 1977:

• In November 1976, the first IHQ country summary treated IHQ as a plannable entity, like a country, and put forward specific objectives including “to set up an agreed and equitable funding process for IHQ . . .”
• In January 1977, McGilchrist presented to Sanny and others, such as Mayhall and Sargent, a paper on the “Functions and Finances of IHQ” which argued that “the current method of financing IHQ, namely an unstable medley of designated gifts, NavPress profit, psychological pressures on overseas and the US “Where Needed Most” fund, is certainly not the generic solution toward which Jack was moving us,” and which proposed that the senior staff within IHQ should raise their own salaries and benefits.14
• In June 1977, the first meeting of the president’s development council15 took place, organized by and for IHQ. The amount of $60,000 was pledged.
• In July 1977, Sanny wrote a brief paper in which he stated that IHQ should “commit ourselves collectively and individually to take responsibility for IHQ financing as well as to help others . . . and to make IHQ solvency our first priority until that is accomplished.”
• In 1976-1977, the subsidy to IHQ from the US “Where Needed Most” fund reached the record level of $164,000.

A secondary concern was that the new International Leadership Team decided to proceed with several examples of what we would now call “unfunded mandates.” For example:

• The April 1975 ILT sanctioned a Ghana investment of up to $250,000 per year.
• The December 1977 ILT approved the leadership/management project.
• The December 1977 ILT similarly approved the 1980 world leadership conference.

McGilchrist argued that the scope of such international financial needs should be defined and that they not be approved without an identified funding source. It was important to pursue a disciplined approach.16

Emerging Tensions

Because IHQ was treated as a “country” from 1974, those seconded to IHQ were no longer at the disposition of their home countries. Thus, they had to be sought through our framework for allocations. They were missionaries to the country which we called IHQ.

Thus, for example, when Sanny wanted an executive director, his request came to our allocations committee as code 83081 for an area Rep of any nationality, to be based in Colorado Springs. The job description was submitted to the committee on July 26, 1982 and approved by them on October 22, 1982. It only barely qualified! It was category 5 in our framework: “Specialized resource necessary to advance a growing ministry significantly.” However, this cleared the way for Jerry White to fill the allocation.

As IHQ took shape, during the late 1970s, tensions began to increase between the leaders of the two HQs. As often is the case, money was an issue. There was a concern, from the US director (Mayhall) especially, about the perceived burden of subsidizing IHQ (with largely “American” gift income) without him having control over the IHQ budget.

This concern could not merely be explained as Mayhall’s conceptual framework, though this was evident. Other factors included:

• The expansion of IHQ, as people were added who were not directly assisting Sanny in his responsibilities, namely Bob Hage, Doug Sparks, Ken Choat, Roc Bottomly, Joyce Turner.
• The rising influence of the US board, which now had a majority of outside directors.
• Strenuous efforts, led by Lauren Libby, to raise gifts in the US directly for IHQ.

This third factor was very volatile. As IHQ saw it, they were responsibly attempting to cover their own costs. However, when they developed a fundraising campaign called “project start up,”17 in late 1979, they did not include Rod Sargent in their original planning. An error!

Also, a problem surfaced which persisted for at least the next twenty years and which required frequent coordination: namely, whose were our large donors? A case occurred in which a donor18 was approached both by IHQ and by USHQ within a few months. From Mayhall’s perspective, at least on his more gloomy days, they were American donors who should be giving to the US Navs (“receipted income belongs to the US corporation”). From Sanny’s perspective, they were his close friends who wanted to keep on responding to his needs and should not be required to peer into our internal structural arrangements.

In March 1978, Mayhall wrote an important memo to Jim Downing and McGilchrist in which he stated that “there is a growing gulf developing between the IHQ and US headquarters. This began shortly after IHQ started to move in the direction of financial independence. . . . The frustration level is increasing. . . . A sense of unity is in jeopardy.” A week later, he tried again in a memo to McGilchrist seeking “clarification on the direction of IHQ” and raising questions about the location, liaison, and relationship between IHQ and USHQ. Specifically, should he (Mayhall) move his office?19

Surprisingly, Mayhall stated that, “USHQ has no direct access to money for funding any project other than meeting its own budget. . . . The only financial resource the US director has for funding unfunded projects is to go to the US regions and ask them to accept responsibility for raising the money. . . . While we deeply appreciate the willingness of IHQ people to be involved in fundraising activities, it is a wrong decision in my opinion for IHQ to have financial independence as a goal. In fact, again in my opinion, it is not only an unrealistic goal (but) it is an impossible dream apart from some kind of worldwide assessment system.”20

One sees here a tension between the legal and the relational, which was still needing attention early in the next century.21

This was disruptive enough that it is worth quoting some snapshots that surfaced22 as capturing the more agitated facets of how USHQ could experience IHQ, financially:

• “Sanny is not raising money for The Navigators.”
• “Sanny is wasting his time—going after small gifts.”
• “Sargent is the expert: don’t argue.”
• Resistance to the IHQ emphasis upon designated support.
• Ownership of individual donors.
• Desserts and banquets: USHQ preferred the latter, IHQ the former.

Some of these seem petty or extreme.23 It is true that normal business continued to be conducted with grace and civility. However, they illustrate irritants that, if left unattended and undiscussed, could be damaging.24
Lauren Libby was raising money for IHQ and the much more senior Rod Sargent (and his team) was raising money for US needs. In spite of their personal friendship, opportunities for misunderstanding were ample. One example was a US policy introduced in September 1981: “Solicitation of funds through foundations, planned giving prospects, or large donors must have the approval of the vice president—development,” (namely Sargent).

McGilchrist25 worked with Sargent to clarify his intent and reported to the IHQ team that: “This policy is a useful device for improving coordination . . . and we need have no fear that it will restrict our ability to raise money for IHQ. Indeed, the policy should help us avoid the occasional embarrassment of approaching an overloaded donor . . .”

Tension, at least between Sanny and Mayhall, peaked when Sanny, who was still chairman of the US board, saw that the proposed agenda for a session of the board presented a financial summary arranged so that the US Navs were breaking even except that IHQ was in deficit. Sanny correctly saw himself as the leader of the worldwide Navigators and did not appreciate the implication that he (and his immediate team) was the financial problem. A strong confrontation between the two leaders ensued. Sanny’s handwritten notes show his concern. For example: “Can you work on a relationship when you are not in control? I do not feel I understand or even know you, though you feel quite certain you know me.” Here, we see a relational disconnect that went deeper than finances.26

Around this time, McGilchrist had picked up comments such as: “IHQ is the source of our financial problems . . . and indeed, is not especially useful.” A doubly damaging sentiment.27

Bob Sheffield wisely called together the principal actors for a lengthy exchange of views28 on financial issues. This helped to clear the air, but it did not settle on decisions.

Now, the above has looked only at one persistent irritant: money. It was exacerbated by the common mistake of talking about rather than to one another. Here, Sanchez’s solution, as one might expect, was to put on a joint seminar on interpersonal relationships. However, this would not have resolved the structural and functional issues.29

An example of the positive aspects of Mayhall’s focus upon money30 was that he introduced an eighth31 strategic global imperative in late 1980, which was clearly desirable, but that had been overlooked by the international leadership conference participants. Thus: “We must develop a comprehensive and biblically-based financial strategy that includes our philosophy, lifestyle, fundraising, and financial management” (Proverbs 30:8-9).

Attempts to Develop a More Relational Structure

In December 1980, George Sanchez was confirmed in the new position of international ministries director, responsible for the work outside the USA.32 The position of divisional director was replaced by a larger group of regional directors (e.g. three in Europe) comprising George’s team, the International Ministries Leadership Team, conceptually parallel to the USLT. The attached shows the elegant but dangerous structural balance. Sanny now had the US director (Mayhall) and the international ministries director (Sanchez) and his international administrator (McGilchrist) as direct reports, forming the IET. He had finally been able to delegate the “overseas” ministries in the same way as he had delegated the US ministries, thanks to Mayhall’s good analysis, in 1974.

There were two views on what this structure (illustrated in attachment A) would accomplish. Positively, relationships would be clarified and enhanced at each level of leadership by the meeting not only of the International Executive Team but annually by the balanced membership of the new International Navigator Council (INC), and infrequently of the International Leadership Conference (ILC).33

From Sanny’s perspective, he had introduced an experienced leader (Sanchez) to strengthen the ministries outside the US and now had a clearer chain of command.

Negatively, an international board with global responsibilities was envisioned, but soon proved to be impracticable.34 Thus, the US board continued to be dominant, even though other national boards had been formed. More seriously, this structure posited a new doctrine: The Navigator world should neatly be separated into the US and the rest, which hardly captured our deepening interdependence as a global society.35

This new structure did not last long, once the concept of an international board was dropped. This was good, because in one sense, it would have taken us back to the days when our early American leaders understandably thought of the Navigator world as comprising the US and overseas.

Now, to return to the position of McGilchrist. In a memo to the International Executive Team in early 1982,36 Sanny used his need for information on endowments as an illustration of his conviction, while admitting that he could well be wrong. It covered his use of McGilchrist. Extracts of what he wrote include:

• If I say to Donald, “I need such and such information on endowments,” and Donald sends a memo (to a US leader), the response might be, “What does he want that for?” or, “Don’t they think we know what we’re doing?”
• So, I find myself thinking that I can’t use Donald to get this information for me. So I have to take the time to do it myself.
• Furthermore, since I perceive that Donald’s inquiries are taken as a threat or lack of confidence, I find myself thinking of going outside the Navs for information.
• I can do that, but it takes more time.
• If I ask Donald to go outside the Navs to get information for me, particularly on things on which we have in-staff experts, that would be disastrous. It would really communicate that we don’t believe that they know what they are doing.

His conclusion? “I think that Sheffield is indispensable to Mayhall (US director) and McGilchrist to me, if we are to make significant progress this year. . . . I must be able to work through McGilchrist in the full range of my job, and the same is true for Mayhall working through Sheffield. Therefore, we should determine what is necessary to help McGilchrist and Sheffield be what they need to be.

Sheffield and McGilchrist Recommendations for Improved Relations

Soon after, Sheffield and McGilchrist were assigned the joint project of recommending to the IET “a strategy for resolving most of the difficulties that are said to have harmed relationships between participants in IHQ and USHQ.” They interviewed six leaders in each of the two headquarters and summarized their comments in a form that both of them individually agreed to be an accurate reflection of what they had heard.

The interviewees had diverse opinions. Some had little to contribute, and others a lot, ranging up to a detailed review by Sanny of our history from his perspective. Mayhall also contributed an account of our history, and McGilchrist contributed a paper on what he called “Underlying Concepts.”

Opinions ranged from those who would abolish IHQ, to those who considered that IHQ did not exist in practice, to those who felt we were all in IHQ!

The two men evaluated the various theories and views, in order to draw out some causes and issues. They settled on seven problems that they saw as significant:

1. Roles: Sanny and Mayhall
2. Role: McGilchrist
3. Confusion: IHQ and USHQ
4. Lack of written understandings and agreements
5. Relationship: Sanny and Mayhall
6. Relationship: Mayhall and the rest of the IET
7. Not working at relationships.

Why had these problems come to the surface? What had happened, simply, is that as IHQ gradually emerged:

• IHQ failed to justify/interpret and communicate the new situation
• USHQ failed to adjust to and give scope for the emergence of IHQ.

Sheffield pointed out in July 1982 that, as long as IHQ remained legally part of the US corporation, areas of tension would surface. He was not in favor of altering our legal structure, but felt that “agreements and procedures for handling future disputes” would help. He put forward three pages of proposals.37

McGilchrist’s concerns38 were that, when Sanny interposed himself into an IHQ-USHQ issue, he was often functioning more as the US president (Mayhall’s “internal” supervisor) than as the leader of our worldwide ministries. In 1981, for example, there had been almost no meetings between the executives in IHQ and USHQ. Instead, concerns were channeled to Sanny or Mayhall respectively. Thus, every issue tended to become a crisis. McGilchrist saw IHQ as of worldwide relevance, not merely a pawn to be moved in order to accommodate US pressures. He urged Sanny to pursue principled solutions that would stand his successor in good stead.

Sanny had decided and declared that he intended to continue to have an IHQ, so that the two men (McGilchrist and Sheffield) proceeded with developing a framework for solutions. In September 1982, they produced a set of working agreements. These were not fully adopted, largely because it was known that Jerry White would soon be arriving as executive director and that Jack Mayhall was being considered for the position of Europe director.39 In any case, the working agreements set out “to clarify and enhance the interaction between the two headquarters, especially as regards administrative process and authority.”

However, Sheffield moved on, becoming RD for the Western region in June 1983.Then, in August 1983, Terry Taylor was appointed deputy US director, under Mayhall, leaving the Southeast region. He was replaced by Darrell Sanders.40

The final version of the report on IHQ-USHQ relationships by Sheffield and McGilchrist was given to Sanny in March 1983.41 It condensed the interviews and made recommendations on what were seen as the three major areas of need:

1. Negotiated roles
2. Working agreements
3. Biblical relationships

By this time, Jerry White had become executive director.42 Immediately, he had to deal with the volatile relationship between Mayhall and Sheffield, and with some tensions between Mayhall and his USLT. The US structure was unsettled with disagreements over when Sheffield should become director of the Western region, and over finances. Mayhall still tended to approach issues structurally rather than relationally and lacked a certain sensitivity. He had become somewhat isolated. Sheffield, by contrast, could sometimes be impulsive. In practice, he was by now hardly functioning as Mayhall’s deputy. Jerry soon realized that, at least during 1983, his principal task was to attend to the US Navigators.

The recommendations of the above report were not formally adopted, though one can certainly trace various recommendations being followed. Reasons? White was making his own diagnoses and interventions, both Mayhall and Sheffield were beginning transitions, and McGilchrist was learning to rein in his advocacy of rational clarity and analysis, which Jerry Bridges referred to as his “gracious assertiveness.”43

By 1984, other matters were occupying both the IET and our senior US leaders. These included:

• January 1984: “Women: The Biblical Bases” accepted at INC
• January 1984: Decision to work up a project on our Global Society
• April 1984: Terry Taylor appointed US director
• May 1984: Move to three US divisions and field directors
• May 1984: New USLT assumes responsibility
• July 1984: Formation of Commonwealth Bloc
• August 1984: Launch of US missions department
• September 1984: Launch of US Leadership Development Institute (Rineharts)
• September 1984: Launch of US Hispanic ministry (Larry Blake)
• October 1984: Launch of US Church Discipleship Ministries (CDM)

Influences of New US and IET Leaders

Later developments included the subsequent merge into wider aspects of how the IET (and their supporting office) and our US leaders handled their proximity, and, more significantly, their strong mutual influence in the progress of The Navigators.

From his appointment in April 1984, Taylor enjoyed an extended “honeymoon” period as US director, in terms of relating to IHQ. Concerns began to be expressed later by our international elders.

From January 1988, becoming a Global Society would have implications for “headquarters” functions.44 Also, Sanny expressed concerns about autonomy and accountability, especially as regards the general director’s relationship with the US board.

After Stanley joined the IET in August 1990, there were concerns about what some saw as his reaching into internal US field matters.

In April 1992, the US decision to participate in The CoMission would be a source of serious tension between the IET and our US Leaders.

On the other hand, the ten years from 1997 in which Alan Andrews served as US director were a period of unusual harmony and collaboration. A prominent symbol of this was that Andrews had the IET join his USLT on the platform during a session of the August 1999 US staff conference in Florida.

A fresh attempt to express the relationship between the international and US presidents was negotiated early in the new century, with new principals and more clarity on our legal environment. It was titled “Statement of Accountabilities in the Worldwide Partnership.”45 This document clarifies in formal terms the separate spheres of ministry of the two aforementioned presidents46 within The Navigators. Specifically:

• The lines of spiritual authority and relational accountability between the international president, the US board, the US president, and other regional and partnering country directors.
• The lines of legal authority and accountability between the US board, the international president and the US president.

Essentially, the international president “exercises his spiritual authority and leadership primarily through relational influence, and over the US director through relational influence and mutual covenantal agreements; but the international president does not exercise legal authority over the US president.”

The document assumed that the international president would continue to be an employee of our US corporation. In the future, this might not be so.

By Donald McGilchrist
5972 words

See also articles on:
Global Planning: 1966 – 1975
Management by Objectives: 1968 – 1974
Global Planning: 1976 –
Structures in the Seventies
Surge and Stress: Missions in the Seventies
Boards of Directors
Lorne Sanny’s Role as President
Structures in the Early Eighties
Authority and Submission
Our Enabling Global Society
The CoMission

Link to attachments

Leaders of The Navigators and Organizational Chart

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Endnotes

1. Scott provides an interesting glimpse of the perceived imbalance between Sanny’s detailed attention to US affairs and his looser guidance of other ministries. Around 1971, Sanny asked his seven closest associates to rate his management style: Scott and Sparks found him a good delegator, but the US-based men graded him only “fair.” Source: Double Helix, p. 552.
2. He was implementing Sanny’s project description of March 6, 1973, which called for an “international headquarters reorganization . . . to determine the best structure . . . and the best financing for our headquarters.” Sanny accepted Mayhall’s solution on December 9, 1974.
3. This reason actually read: “to be the internal equivalent of the external ILT concept.” The first meeting of the ILT came in April 1975.
4. It is probably not a coincidence that the first comprehensive list of our worldwide staff was produced by Bob in May 1973.
5. McGilchrist had served as Doug Sparks’s assistant in the EMA division since April 1971. His transfer was significant as the first non-American to serve in the newly restructured international HQ. It is curious that Sanny mentioned in his January 1975 “Dear Staff” letter that he was “being considered to replace Henrichsen,” given the spread of the latter’s responsibilities.
6. Sanny continued until the early 1990s as chairman of the US board.
7. Hitherto, their gatherings had usually been called divisional directors conferences. Now, a team!
8. “Future,” of course, was a key word. Although the UK and the Netherlands and Singapore qualified as “sending” countries during the early 1970s, it was not until the 1980s that they were deemed to be “established” (later, “partnering”) countries.
9. Other configurations had been analyzed. At the December 1973 corporate planning conference, for example, Rod Sargent reported that: “The latest thinking on necessary facilities is two new buildings. One would be the international headquarters office for personnel on the corporate management team and the other would be for administrative services. Source: CPC notes, section 1.2.6, p. 9.
10. Source: December 1973 CPC notes 1.2.6b, p. 9.
11. Budgeted cost $1.2 million for our current south building, dedicated in February 1978 as the US administration building.
12. This was an abrupt transition. Gray recalls that upon his return from ministering in Toronto, his assistant, Roy Zinn, met him at the airport with the news. He comments, philosophically, that this decision by Sanny (who later apologized for the way it was done) gave him freedom to develop his physicians ministry. In fact, he was soon assigned as director of our work in Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, returning to COS in 1981. Source: Gray-McGilchrist conversation on May 16, 2016.
13. The following five bullets taken from “IHQ-USHQ Financial Background,” McGilchrist of June 17, 1981.
14. Some of the senior leaders in IHQ were only partly supported by gifts, and the salaries of almost all their assistants had traditionally been covered from US sources. As yet, the new slim version of IHQ did not have a designated fund-raiser or a development department. However, it did have heavy expenses, accentuated by the extent of international travel.
15. The first meeting of the small group of major donors who formed the PDC took place in the bighorn building at Glen Eyrie. Sanny took time to review our progress and how we were seeing God’s hand on many aspects of The Navigators. Gene Warr, who was a friend of strong and generous convictions, bluntly interrupted him with one sentence: “How much money do you want?”
16. McGilchrist proposal to ILT conference on international financial needs, April 3, 1978.
17. In September 1979, Sanny committed himself in front of the USLT to balancing IHQ income and expenses during 1979-1980, and Project Start-Up was launched soon afterwards.
18. Dutch Karickhoff who had been discipled by Mayhall but was now also supporting Sanny.
19. The above developments are taken from “IHQ – USHQ Financial Background” by McGilchrist, dated June 17, 1981.
20. In this context, it is interesting that, in April 1977, the International Leadership Team rejected a proposal from McGilchrist to finance IHQ with a 2 percent charge on all Representatives.
21. See, for example, the April 2004 “Relational Charter,” which carefully parsed the relationship of the international president to the US board, in terms of both spiritual and legal authority.
22. Distilled from comments during a discussion on IHQ-USHQ relationships as seen from IHQ: meeting of June 17, 1981; Sanny, Lauren Libby, McGilchrist, Paul Ronka, George Sanchez.
23. Of course, the concerns communicated by USHQ leaders differed, at least in tone, depending on whether comments were made to Sanny or Libby or McGilchrist.
24. In context, The Navigators were experiencing considerable stress in the second half of the 1970s as the number of returned missionaries rose sharply.
25. McGilchrist to IHQ team of July 15, 1981, copy to Sargent.
26. Back in his office, Sanny felt that they had cleared the air on feelings. However, he wrote that he found the confrontation “confusing, unsatisfactory, inconclusive, disappointing.” He also told Mayhall that it would be best for him to have a very clear job description with a very clear delegation of authority. Source: papers in McGilchrist box 1.
27. In context, one should bear in mind that some middle managers in USHQ believed that IHQ served only our non-American ministries.
28. See agenda and notes of meeting in McGilchrist box 1.
29. Another potential source of tension was the close proximity of the two HQs. There was a natural tendency among some IHQ leaders to continue their patterns of operation. After all, they were Americans and all their roots were in the US Navigators. Example: Downing’s views on the approach road to the Glen.
30. Also, it is encouraging to note that, years later, Mayhall gave valuable counsel on financial matters to various staff.
31. In January 1984, these imperatives were extended to ten and later folded into our crucial success factors.
32. Note this reversion to “international” as meaning outside the USA, while international HQ still used the term as meaning worldwide!
33. ILC 1 gathered in February 1980 with 164 participants of twenty-three nationalities. ILC 2 was proposed for around 1986 but did not take place.
34. See article on “Boards of Directors” for this history.
35. The term “global society” was in circulation during the early 1980s though not formally adopted until January 1988. McGilchrist’s view of the structure illustrated was, in simple language, that it encouraged us to “do the splits.”
36. Memo of February 16, 1982.
37. Sheffield to McGilchrist of July 15, 1982.
38. This paragraph from a presentation to Sanny on February 14, 1982.
39. Instead, Taylor was appointed deputy US director in August 1983 and replaced Jack as US director in April 1984. Mayhall became our first CDM director in September 1985.
40. In November 1983, Skip Gray was appointed Glen Eyrie Director, with Bob Stephens as general manager.
41. Twenty pages, dated March 1, 1983.
42. January 17, 1983, taking responsibility for Mayhall, Sanchez, McGilchrist (the IET) on July 16, 1983.
43. In earlier years, Sanny had referred occasionally to McGilchrist as “a velvet-covered brick,” borrowing the sobriquet from Howard Butt’s popular 1973 book.
44. For example, a task force on financing supranational operations was assigned to analyze the income and expense streams for our various regional HQs and IHQ. While this research was proceeding, our International Council approved an agreement on financial charges for three years starting September 1, 1989.
45. See US corporate documents at December 2005,. This was based on the documents appended to the relational charter of March 2004.
46. See attachments for the tenure of these presidents.